In this paper we present a model where agents can choose between 1 productive and rent-seeking activities. We consider two governance institutions: show that rent-seekers may be interested in overthrowing autocracy. 
good economic performance is the effect of institutions that constraint govern-84 ment (North 1981 , 1990 , Acemoglu et al. 2001 , Easterly and Levine 2003 and 85 Rodrik et al. 2004 ). This view has been criticized by Glaeser et al. (2004) . They 86 stress the role of human capital and good policies for good economic perfor-87 mance. Again our model gives some merit to both views but stress that there is 88 not a single-valued mapping between institutions and policies. All these papers are silent on issues of governance which is the main focus of 97 our paper. 2
98
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model. Section 3 99 gathers our results. The paper ends with a section of conclusions which com-100 ments on our assumptions and offers some suggestions for future research.
101 2 In our model machanisms of external controil of the organization are missing (i.e. corrupt parliaments can be controlled by voters and corrupt BOD can be controlled by competition), This is done to highlight the similitudes between parliaments and BOD. 
The model

102
The organization produces two kinds of goods: The good sought by rent-seekers, 103 which we will call the prize (a position in a committee/a duchy) and a differen-104 tiated good. There is a sole input (labor/capital) which is the numeraire.
105
The single owner (autocrat) collects revenues by a tax on output. 3 Let t be 106 the tax rate. The autocrat transforms part of taxes in the prize.
107
There are N active agents who either organize the production inside the 108 organization, call them entrepreneurs, or are rent-seekers. Suppose that there 109 are m entrepreneurs (later on we will explain how the equilibrium value of m 110 is determined). Each entrepreneur produces a differentiated good and faces an 111 inverse demand function of the following form, Each entrepreneur has access to assets (i.e. technology) that allow him to 125 convert one unit of input in 1/g units of product. Thus, 1/g is the productivity 126 of the input in the productive sector. We will assume that (a − g)/b > 0. In 127 the linear case it means that the marginal cost is below the price that makes 128 demand zero. In the isoelastic case, it means that the marginal cost is positive. In our model only the owner can set taxes. For a model where active agents can also set taxes see Rosenthal (Bates et al. 1998) . 4 If, for simplicity, we assume that the product is homogeneous, preferences of the consumer are representable by the following utility function where l is consumption of the input (leisure):
129
Profits for
5 In the case of a kingdom profits are spent in the labor market. 
It can be shown that second order conditions hold and the system of FOC 138 has only symmetric solutions. At the unique equilibrium, output and prices are
(2.1)
Since equilibrium is symmetric, let us denote the market price by p. 1980) . σ i can also be interpreted as the fraction of the prize obtained by i.
152
We assume that the cost of effort, denoted by C i is linear, C i = cG i , c > 0.
153
Thus, payoffs for i are
155
Given V and n each rent-seeker chooses effort in order to maximize payoffs 156 taken as given the effort of other rent-seekers. FOC of payoff maximization are
u n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f
It is easy to see that the second order condition holds and that the system above 159 only includes symmetrical solutions. 6 This yields,
The utility function of the autocrat is U = (
C is his consumption of the numeraire. The prize is produced by the autocrat 165 under constant returns to scale. Let e be the average productivity of the input 166 in the production of the prize. An interpretation is that the prize consists of the 167 value of the input plus the prestige given by the status achieved with the prize.
168
In this case, e > 1 reflects the value added by the status. 7 Also e reflects the 169 degree of law enforcement of the laws that provide a legal cover for the prize 170 owner.
171
Taxes can be spent either in C or in the production of the prize. Hence We assume that when the autocrat maximizes T he assumes that the number 176 of rent seekers is given. This is because the decision to enter one of the two 177 activities is a long run decision requiring a particular kind of education in the 178 early youth and so is not likely to be influenced by changes in the tax rate.
179
In the kingdom model, this may be interpreted as saying that agents cannot the interpretation is that to change profession involves a high transaction cost.
The above is the Laffer curve of our economy. Maximization of T amounts 188 to choosing t to maximize t(a − g − t)
1 α subject to 0 ≤ t ≤ a − g (the second 189 inequality says that output is non-negative, see (2.1)). Given that T is contin- 
The utility function can be re-written as U = V β C 1−β .
201
The maximization of utility givenT yields C =T(1 − β) and V = eβT.
202
Finally, we assume that active agents can freely enter into rent-seeking or 203 production activities. Assuming for simplicity that n and m are real numbers,
204
free entry implies that
The game is played in three stages. In the first, active agents decide if they 207 produce or become rent-seekers. In the second, the autocrat maximizes reve- 2. Given n and m, the parliament decides about t by majority voting.
226
8 The order of stages is identical to that in many models of Industrial Organization: first location, followed by the decicion about the tax and, finally, competition.
u n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f 
236
Since t * = α(a−g) 1+α , from (2.1 ) we obtain that
238
Simplifying and taking into account that m = N − n,
The left hand side of (3.1) is positive for n = N and negative for n = 0.
241
Hence, there is a value of n such that (3.1) holds. Such a value is unique since 242 the left hand side of (3.1) is strictly increasing in n. 
Notice that u does not depend on , γ , θ , b, N and c. 9 The effects on u of e
260
and β are what we expect: For instance a decrease in e, reflecting a weaker 261 enforcement of laws that provide a legal cover to rent-seeking, decreases the 262 relative size of it. However the effects of α and (a−g) on u are not that intuitive:
The effect of a − g on u depends on the impact of a − g on t * since u = eβt * .
266
Under isoelastic demand (α < 0) an increase of a−g reduces u because demand with the maximum at t = 0. Hence the largest group will impose its most 282 preferred policy.
283
Remark 2 If N > 2, m = N and t = 0 is an equilibrium of corporate governance. 
299
Proof For the time being take = 1. Write (3.1) with β = 1, and γ = 0 as
Tedious algebra shows that 2n > N iff 2e(α − θ + 1) > N(1 − θ e). This is Part 304 a). If eθ = 1 (3.1) reads (2Nθ
Finally, let < 1. As noticed in Footnote 9, n is decreasing on . Thus, if
307
< 1 the number of rent-seekers increases in relationship with those in the 308 case = 1 and the previous result holds a fortiori.
309
Proposition 3 states two sufficient conditions for the parliament to be dom-310 inated by rent-seekers. 10 The most interesting case is a) that if the product 
.
321
Proof Write (3.1) with β = γ = 1 as
) .
324
Tedious algebra shows that n > N/2 iff N(1 − e(1 + α)(1 − )) < 2e (1 + α).
325
Case a) above holds when e or α are large and small. Case b) is identical to
which looks like a rather special case. 
336
The relative size of rent-seeking activities under a parliament dominated by 337 rent-seekers is determined by Eq. (3.2) with β = 1. Therefore, Remark 1 applies 338 to this case. We now study other properties of this kind of equilibrium. Proof From Eq. (3.1) is clear that n is increasing in β. Since the only difference 342 between autocracy and corporate governance when the parliament is domi-343 nated by rent-seekers is that in the latter β = 1, the result about n follows.
344
Lastly, it is easy to see in (2.1 ) that p is decreasing in m.
345
The logic behind Proposition 5 is that if a parliament is dominated by 346 rent-seekers, all taxes are spent in building the prize and this attracts more 3) The difficulty of enforcing the laws protecting rent-seekers (Tullock 1992). 2) The form of the demand function. The case of α > 0 is favorable to rent-406 seekers in Remark 1 (in this case technical progress is favorable to rent-seekers) 407 and Propositions 3 and 6 (in this case a parliament dominated by rent-seekers 408 exists with independence of the number of active agents).
409
From the point of view of the theory of the firm, our main finding is that 410 we can model corporate governance without any role for mechanism design 411 and explain executive compensations as the surplus obtained in production and 
415
We end the paper by suggesting some avenues of research. 14 Ekelund and Tollison suggested that the basic cause of the English Civil War (1642-1651) was the desire of the Parliament to take over the profits of the rent-seeking activities of the king.
